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Introduction 
On October 28, 2015, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
Dispute Settlement Body adopted an Appellate Body report ruling on 
China—HP-SSST.1 It concluded that Chinese antidumping duties, 
imposed on high performance stainless steel seamless tubes (HP-
SSSTs), violated the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agree-
ment) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT).2 
The Appellate Body upheld the prior Panel decision and clarified re-
quirements of national investigating authorities conducting antidump-
ing injury analyses. WTO case law is notably underdeveloped regarding 
dumping investigation injury procedures.3 
 
1. Appellate Body Reports, China—Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties 
on High Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (“HP-SSST”) From 
Japan, China—Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High Perform-
ance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (“HP-SSST”) From the European Union, 
WTO Docs. WT/DS454/AB/R, WT/DS460/AB/R (adopted Oct. 28, 2015) 
[hereinafter HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports]. 
2. Id. at 104, 107; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1868 
U.N.T.S 201 [hereinafter Antidumping Agreement]; General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GATT]. 
3. John H. Jackson et al., Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations Cases, Materials and Text 913 (6th ed. 2013) (“WTO case 
law in [material injury investigations] is spotty.”). 
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Steel is one product that is frequently subject to antidumping inves-
tigations.4 Likewise, Chinese exporters are often targets of antidumping 
investigation.5 This is especially relevant to Chinese steel. The Chinese 
steel industry has grown rapidly since 1978, when it was the world’s 
fifth largest steel producer.6 Fast-forward twenty-eight years, China 
dominated the world’s steel market. In 2006, it produced 400 million 
tons.7 It currently produces more than any other country. In fact, China 
churns out more steel than the United States, the European Union, 
Russia, and Japan combined.8 
Chinese steel is also relevant to how China treats steel imports. 
China—HP-SSST involves an antidumping investigation conducted by 
Chinese authorities to determine whether European and Japanese man-
ufacturers were dumping HP-SSSTs in China. This case comment pres-
ents an overview of China—HP-SSST. It focuses on the current Chinese 
injury analysis under WTO and Chinese law. Part I provides a brief 
overview of WTO antidumping laws and injury analysis proceedings. 
Part II summarizes the Appellate Body’s critical holdings in China—
HP-SSST. Part III concludes with a critique of the case’s key holding, 
on price undercutting, and considers statistics about China as a respon-
dent in antidumping cases. 
I. Overview of Dumping Laws 
Dumping is simple in theory but complex in application. It occurs 
when a producer in one country exports goods and endeavors to sell 
 
4. Xiaochen Wu, Anti-Dumping Law and Practice of China 4 (2009) 
(“The steel and chemical industries have been the principal focus of anti-
dumping investigations around the world . . . .”). 
5. From January 1, 1995, to December 31, 2014, Chinese exports were subject 
to 1,052 antidumping investigations throughout the world. This is more than 
any other country during the period. The second closest was the Republic of 
Korea, which was investigated 349 times. WTO, Anti-Dumping Initiations: 
By Exporter 01/01/1995–31/12/2014, https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/adp_e/AD_InitiationsByExpCty.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3JQ- 
NWTB] (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
6. Wu, supra note 4, at 3–4 (“[I]n 1978, China’s total steel output was 31.78 
million tons and ranked the world’s fifth largest. By 1996, China had become 
the world’s largest steel producer, its output having reached 101.24 million 
tons. In 2006, China’s steel output was more than 400 million tons.”). 
7. Id. at 4.  
8. Ivana Kottasova, China’s Slowdown is Killing Thousands of Steel Jobs, 
CNN (Oct. 19, 2015, 1:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/19/news/ 
economy/china-slowdown-steel-jobs [https://perma.cc/2VES-JFW2] (“China 
produces half of the world’s steel, more than the United States, European 
Union, Russia and Japan combined.”). 
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them in another country below normal value.9 The difference between 
normal value and export price is called the dumping margin.10 The 
GATT condemns dumping when it causes material injury to producers 
in an importing country.11 In spite of condemnation, it is impossible for 
WTO members to contest dumping before the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB).12 Instead, members conduct self-directed dumping investigat-
ions.13 
The Antidumping Agreement is a touchstone for investigation pro-
cedures. An affirmative dumping investigation presumes a determin-
ation of dumping and a determination of injury.14 Procedures are based 
on the Antidumping Agreement, but vary by country.15 The United 
States divides investigations between the International Trade Adminis-
tration (ITA) and the International Trade Commission (ITC).16 The 
ITA accepts initial petitions to conduct dumping investigations.17 It 
also directs determinations of dumping.18 The ITC directs determin-
ations of injury.19 In China, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Commerce 
 
9. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2.1.  
10. The price of a good in its originating country is called its “normal value” (NV). 
NV is compared to the good’s price in the importing country, which is called 
“export price” (XP). Id. An investigating authority may substitute other 
values for NV. For instance, it may compare the price of the good in a third-
party country or the cost of production plus a reasonable amount for profit 
with XP. Id. art. 2.2. 
11. GATT, supra note 2, art. VI. 
12. The Dispute Settlement Body governs and settles disputes tendered to the 
WTO. It has the power to establish panels and to adopt panel and appellate 
body reports referred by members. Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401. See also Daniel T. Shedd et al., Cong. Research Serv., 
RS20088, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO): An Overview (2012) (discussing the WTO process for dispute 
resolution among member nations).  
13. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 1, 5. 
14. Id. arts. 2, 3. 
15. HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 5.141 (“Article 3 does not 
prescribe a specific methodology to be relied on by an investigating authority 
in its determination of injury.”). 
16. William J. Davey & John H. Jackson, Reform of the Administrative Proce-
dures Used in U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 6 Admin. 
L.J. Am. U. 399, 407 (1992). 
17. Id. at 408.  
18. Id. at 408–09. 
19. Id. at 408. For an extensive explanation of American dumping investigations, 
see id. at 407–20. 
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(MOFCOM) conducts both determinations of dumping and the deter-
minations of injury.20 
When determining dumping, an investigating authority calculates 
Normal Value and Export Price.21 The difference between these vari-
ables is the dumping margin.22 A determination of injury relies on posi-
tive evidence and must achieve an objective examination.23 It focuses 
on several elements that comprise an objective examination.24 The first 
element is the volume of the dumped imports and “whether there has 
been a significant increase in dumped imports.”25 The second element 
is the effect of the dumped imports on the price of domestic goods.26 
The final element is the overall impact of the dumped goods on the 
domestic industry.27 While the Antidumping Agreement lists these 
three factors as integral components of a balanced determination of 
injury, it does not provide details on how they should be weighed to 
deduce injury.28 In addition, the determination of injury presumes a 
finding of causation. To find causation, an investigating authority must 
eliminate nonattributing factors, forces other than dumping that cause 
material injury to the relevant industry.29 
If the investigating authority finds dumping, injury, and causation, 
then it may impose an antidumping duty.30 Duties cannot exceed the 
 
20. For an extensive explanation of Chinese dumping investigations, see Wu, 
supra note 4, at 145–74. 
21. See supra note 10. 
22. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2.1. 
23. Positive evidence describes “the quality of the evidence that the investigating 
authorities may rely on in making a determination, and requires the evidence 
to be affirmative, objective verifiable, and credible.” HP-SSST Appellate Body 
Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 5.138. An objective examination requires a determin-
ation of injury “conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith 
and fundamental fairness” and be unbiased so that it does not favor any 
interested party. Id. 
24. Id. ¶¶ 5.137–5.139; Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.1. 
25. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.2. 
26. Id. arts. 3.1, 3.2. 
27. Id. arts. 3.1, 3.4. 
28. Id. art. 3.2 (“No one or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive 
guidance.”). 
29. Id. art. 3.5 (“The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than 
the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic indus-
try, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to 
the dumped imports.”). 
30. GATT, supra note 2, art. VI.2.  
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dumping margin.31 The goal of antidumping duties is to reduce market 
distortions and allow all producers “an equal chance to compete.”32 If a 
producer believes that an antidumping duty is wrongful, it must request 
that its government seek corrective action before the WTO DSB.33 
II. China—HP-SSST 
China—HP-SSST began when MOFCOM conducted a dumping 
investigation on HP-SSSTs imported from the European Union and 
Japan.34 The contentious products—high-performance, stainless-steel 
seamless tubes—are components in industrial boilers.35 MOFCOM in-
vestigated the normal value and export price of imported HP-SSSTs 
between July 1, 2010, and June 30, 2011, and then evidence of injury 
to the domestic industry between January 1, 2008, and June 30, 2011.36 
It ultimately determined that Japan and the EU dumped HP-SSSTs 
into the Chinese market, causing material injury, and then imposed an 
antidumping duty, which European and Japanese manufacturers con-
tested.37 
Salzgitter Mannesmann Stainless Tubes and Tubacex Tubos 
Inoxidables, S.A., from Europe, and Sumitomo Metal Industries and 
Kobe Special Tube Co. Ltd., from Japan, (Complainants) petitioned 
 
31. Id. (“[A] contracting party may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping 
duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping . . . .”). 
32. Jackson et al., supra note 3, at 831 (“The basic idea behind [unfair trade] 
rules is sometimes expressed as a desire to create a level playing field where 
the producers of the world all have an equal chance to compete.”). 
33. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 17. 
34. See HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 1.4 (“China’s measure 
at issue in these disputes are set forth in the Preliminary Determination and 
Final Determination of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of 
China (MOFCOM).”). The two Chinese HP-SSST producers that petitioned 
MOFCOM to institute the dumping duty are Jiangsu Wujin Stainless Steel 
Pipe Group Co., Ltd. and Changshu Walsin Specialty Steel Co., Ltd. Id. ¶ 
5.206 n.457. 
35. Id. ¶ 1.4 (“HP-SST is mainly used in the manufacture of pressurized com-
ponents such as superheaters and reheaters of supercritical and ultra-
supercritical boilers.”). Boilers produce energy in power plants. Id. ¶ 5.264 
(quoting investigated Japanese exporters) (“[S]teel tubes used in ultra-
supercritical power plant boilers . . . significantly outperform steel tubes used 
in supercritical power plant boilers . . . .”). 
36. Id. ¶ 1.4 n.20 (“The period of investigation (POI) for the determination of 
dumping was from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011, and the POI for the deter-
mination of injury was from 1 January 2008 to 30 June 2011.”). See supra 
note 10.  
37. Id. ¶¶ 1.2, 1.4, 1.5. 
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their governments to initiate consultations with China.38 When consult-
ations failed, the Complainants requested that the DSB convene a panel 
to resolve the controversy.39 The Panel report held in favor of the Com-
plainants, deciding that MOFCOM violated Article 3 of the Antidump-
ing Agreement.40 It stopped short of holding that MOFCOM failed to 
abide by Articles 3.1 and 3.2 in finding that Grade C imported tubes 
had undercutting effects on domestic Grade C tubes.41 It also declined 
the Complainants’ contention that MOFCOM improperly extended pri-
ce findings pertaining to Grades B and C to domestic Grade A tubes.42 
All three parties appealed.43 The DSB referred the report to the 
Appellate Body, which issued a second report affirming and bolstering 
the initial decision.44 The Appellate Body’s report addressed China’s 
determination of injury extensively.45 MOFCOM’s injury procedures 
incorporate the WTO rubric of Article 3 of the Antidumping Agree-
ment.46 The Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People’s Republic of 
China implement requisite aspects of the Antidumping Agreement.47 In 
 
38. HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1. Consultations are the first 
step of a dispute before requesting the DSB convene a panel. GATT, supra 
note 2, art. XXII. 
39. Panel Reports, China—Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High 
Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (“HP-SSST”) From Japan, 
China—Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High Performance 
Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (“HP-SSST”) From the European Union, 
¶¶ 1.2, 1.3, WTO Docs. WT/DS454/R, WT/DS460/R (adopted Feb. 14, 
2015) [hereinafter HP-SSST Panel Reports]. As many issues raised by Japan 
and the EU overlapped, the Panel (and later the Appellate Body) consolidated 
both cases into a single report.  
40. Id. ¶ 7.144. 
41. Id.  
42. Id.  
43. HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 1.1. 
44. Id. ¶ 5.5.3.2. 
45. This case comment focuses on issues relating to the Appellate Body’s 
rulings on MOFCOM’s injury determination. It does not include any dis-
cussion on whether MOFCOM correctly calculated normal value, whether 
it improperly withheld essential facts about its determination of dumping, 
or whether MOFCOM’s procedures failed to protect business confidential 
information. 
46. Zhōng Huá Rén Mín Gòng Hé Guó Fǎn Qīng Xiāo Tiáo Lì (中华人民共和国
反倾销条例) [Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the St. Council P.R.C., Nov. 26, 2001, amended Mar. 31, 
2004, effective Feb. 17, 2005) Ministry of Commerce, at art. 8, http://english. 
mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/domesticpolicy/200502/200502000
17435.html [https://perma.cc/W7HN-LU9V]. 
47. Id. 
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addition, MOFCOM issues Provisions on Industry Injury Investigation 
for Anti-Dumping, detailing how MOFCOM deduces injury.48 A deter-
mination of injury proceeds according to Article 3.1 of the Antidumping 
Agreement. The Chinese determination of injury begins by ascertaining 
domestic-like products.49 In China—HP-SSST, HP-SSSTs included 
three grades of tubes Grade A, B, and C.50 The Complainants contested 
MOFCOM’s material injury conclusions.51 
The Appellate Body report begins by establishing precedent.52 It 
recognizes that Article 3 paragraphs 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 create a “logic-
al progression” for every determination of injury.53 The logical progress-
ion is a gradual process where one conclusion informs the next.54 Each 
interlocked step builds on the last, leading to a determination on whe-
ther the domestic industry suffered material injury.55 For instance, the 
outcome regarding whether dumped goods have a price effect must 
serve as a “meaningful basis” for a national investigator to assess the 
 
48. Wu, supra note 4, at 405–11. 
49. Id. at 85–89. 
50. HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 5.179 (“MOFCOM 
defined the domestic like product as certain HP-SSST, encompassing three 
product types or grades referred to by the Panel as Grades A, B, and C.”). 
Grade A tubes are the least expensive, and Grade C tubes are the most 
expensive. Id. ¶ 5.181 (“Grade B is approximately double the price of Grade 
A, and Grade C is approximately triple the price of Grade A.”). The Chinese 
domestic industry was defined as two producers. HP-SSST Panel Reports, 
supra note 38, ¶ 7.153 (“MOFCOM defined the domestic industry as 
comprising two domestic producers accounting for a majority proportion of 
total domestic production of the domestic product like the subject imports.”). 
51. HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5.136–5.298. China 
defines material injury as “actually caused and non-negligible injuries to 
domestic industries.” Wu, supra note 4, at 406. 
52. HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5.136–.142. 
53. Id. ¶ 5.140. 
54. Id. ¶¶ 5.140, 5.162 (“Article 3 thus contemplates a ‘logical progression’ in 
the investigating authority’s examination leading to an ultimate determin-
ation of whether dumped imports are causing material injury to the domestic 
industry . . . . A proper assessment of price effects under Article 3.2 is, there-
fore, a necessary building block for the ultimate determination of injury.”). 
55. Id. ¶ 5.141 (“Nor is there a prescribed template or format that an investig-
ating authority must adhere to in making its determination of injury, provided 
that its determination comports with the disciplines that apply under the 
discrete paragraphs of Article 3. These disciplines are necessary, interlinked 
elements of a single, overall analysis addressing the question of whether 
dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 3·2016 
China—HP-SSST and Price Undercutting 
896 
relationship between the price of dumped goods and the state of the 
domestic industry.56 
A. Price Undercutting 
The Complainants contested the Panel’s interpretation of price 
undercutting. Japan renewed the argument that MOFCOM’s method 
for finding price undercutting, where it merely found imported tube 
prices were mathematically lower than domestic tube prices, was inade-
quate because it failed to produce information about the effect of the 
dumped imports on domestic prices.57 The EU added that a simple com-
parison of prices over a single year must be combined with other rele-
vant facts, such as “inverse price movements, a sudden and substantial 
increase in the domestic prices, an increase in the market share of dom-
estic . . . products, and an absence of substitutability.”58 These con-
siderations are all helpful in explaining the effect of dumped goods on 
domestic products.59 The Appellate Body agreed. It reversed the Panel, 
and held that price undercutting investigations must do more than 
merely compare prices, they must compare prices over time.60 Such an 
examination reveals price movements and “trends in the relationship 
between the prices of the dumped imports and those of domestic like 
products.”61 The Appellate Body essentially found a violation because 
MOFCOM did not consider why prices for imported tubes were lower, 
only that they were objectively lower. 
The Appellate Body also fleshed out the word “significant.”62 It 
explained that whether price undercutting is significant depends on “the 
 
56. Id. ¶ 5.162 (“[T]he outcome of the price effects inquiry . . . must be one that 
enables the investigating authority to advance its analysis so as to serve as 
a meaningful basis for its determination as to whether subject imports, through 
such price effects, are causing injury to the domestic industry.”). 
57. Id. ¶ 5.151.  
58. Id. ¶ 5.152. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. ¶ 5.159. 
61. Id. (“[A] proper reading of ‘price undercutting’ . . . suggests that the inquiry 
requires a dynamic assessment of price developments and trends in the rela-
tionship between the prices of the dumped imports and those of domestic 
like products over the entire period of investigation (POI).”). Id. ¶ 5.160 
(“[D]ynamic assessment of price developments and trends in the relationship 
between the prices of the dumped imports and those of domestic like products 
over the duration of the POI.”). 
62. Id. ¶¶ 5.154–.155. The relevant text of Article 3.2 of the Antidumping Agree-
ment reads “whether there has been a ‘significant price undercutting’ by the 
dumped imports.” Id. ¶ 5.155. 
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circumstances of each case.”63 Indicators that price undercutting is sig-
nificant include “the nature of the product . . . how long the price un-
dercutting has been taking place and to what extent, and . . . the 
relative market shares of the product types with respect to which the 
authority has made a finding of price undercutting.”64 The relevant in-
dicators, however, will vary from case to case. 
In addition, the EU argued that MOFCOM incorrectly applied the 
result of the price effect evaluation to the entire domestic HP-SSST 
industry because the domestic industry mainly produces Grade A 
tubes.65 The EU further argued that while foreign producers manu-
facture Grades B and C, any price effect on these grades in the domestic 
market is not indicative of a significant effect on the entire industry 
because the industry mainly produces Grade A tubes.66 Although the 
Appellate Body confirmed that MOFCOM was not required to prove 
price undercutting for each grade, it agreed with the EU’s argument, 
holding that investigating authorities are required to craft results in a 
way that “provide[s] a meaningful basis for subsequently determining 
whether the dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic 
industry.”67 Such a procedure assumes that the agency will “tak[e] into 
account . . . the relative market share of each product type.”68 There-
fore, MOFCOM’s application of price effects from two grades to the 
entire market was deceiving. In fact, there was only price undercutting 
to the segment of the Chinese market that produced Grade B and C 
tubes, which did not constitute a majority of the Chinese market.69 
B. Impact Analysis 
The Complainants also appealed the Panel’s decision on MOF-
COM’s impact analysis. Article 3.4 describes the purpose of an impact 
analysis; it is a method for assessing the effects of dumping and the 
state of the domestic industry.70 The Antidumping Agreement also lists 
economic indices for an investigating authority to consider in evaluating 
 
63. Id. ¶ 5.161 (“What amounts to significant price undercutting—that is, 
whether the undercutting is important, notable, or consequential—will there-
fore necessarily depend on the circumstances of each case.”). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. ¶ 5.177.  
66. Id.; HP-SSST Panel Reports, supra note 42, ¶ 7.182 n.324 (“China concedes 
that the ‘majority’ of domestic production concerned Grade A products.”). 
67. HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 5.180. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. ¶ 5.181. 
70. Id. ¶ 5.204 (“[T]he focus of Article 3.4 is on the state of the domestic 
industry.”). 
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the impact.71 Investigating authorities must assess each factor for an 
impact analysis to comply with WTO law.72 The DSB also held that 
investigating authorities must explain in their final report which factors 
they deem relevant, which factors they consider irrelevant, and why.73 
The Complainants’ argument was that MOFCOM should have 
applied results gleaned in volume and price effect examinations toward 
its impact analysis on a segmented basis.74 In other words, MOFCOM’s 
failure to find patterns in volume and affirmative price effects for 
Grades B and C tubes only could only have impacted the Chinese mar-
ket for Grade B and C tubes.75 It was, therefore, inappropriate for MOF-
COM to evaluate the impact on the entire industry. The domestic 
market primarily produced Grade A tubes, but importers mostly pro-
duced Grade B and C tubes. Since market share is a factor in Article 
3.4, the Appellate Body found that market share was relevant as a filter 
for applying MOFCOM’s previous findings in the volume and price 
portions of the investigation.76 
The Appellate Body, again, reversed the Panel decision. It declared 
that the logical progression that runs throughout Article 3 applies to 
 
71. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.4 (“The examination of the 
impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall 
include . . . actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, 
productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting 
domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential 
negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability 
to raise capital or investments.”). China codified the factors in Article 7 of 
MOFCOM’s Provisions on Industry Injury Investigation for Anti-Dumping 
Injury. Wu, supra note 4, at 406 (“The examination . . . shall cover the evalu-
ation of all relevant economic factors and indices affecting the situations of 
domestic industries, including sale, profits, amount of production, market 
share, productivity, investment/profit situation or the existing actual or 
potential decrease in equipment utilization rate; the factors affecting the 
domestic prices; the margin of dumping; and the actual or potential negative 
affects on cash flow, stocks, employment, salary, industrial increase, or cap-
ability in fund raising or investment.”). 
72. Panel Report, European Communities—Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports 
of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, ¶ 6.159, WTO Doc. WT/DS141/R 
(adopted Oct. 30, 2000) (“[E]ach of the fifteen factors listed in Art. 3.4 of 
the AD Agreement must be evaluated by the investigating authorities in 
each case in examining the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic 
industry concerned.”). 
73. Id. ¶ 6.162 (“[E]very factor in Article 3.4 must be considered, and that the 
nature of this consideration, including whether the investigating authority 
considered the factor relevant in its analysis of the impact of dumped imports 
on the domestic industry, must be apparent in the final determination.”). 
74. HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 5.195. 
75. Id. 
76.  Id. ¶ 5.207. 
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Article 3.4. The Panel found that the logical progression only applied 
to changes in volume, price, and findings of causation, relying on the 
belief that volume and price should be linked to dumping through caus-
ation.77 It assumed that price and volume are relevant to causation and 
need not be relevant to an impact analysis.78 The Appellate Body 
determined, conversely, that volume and price should be considered in 
an impact analysis, reasoning that such an analysis is for the purpose 
of “understanding . . . the impact of subject imports on the basis of 
[volume and price].”79 Ultimately, the value in Article 3’s logical 
progression is that it exposes “the relationship between subject imports 
and the state of the domestic industry.”80 A logical progression encom-
passes Articles 3.2 and 3.4 in finding injury and ultimately that dump-
ing caused material injury to the domestic industry.81 
The Appellate Body continued by confirming that it was proper for 
MOFCOM to evaluate the impact of imported goods on the state of 
the industry.82 It was not proper for MOFCOM to not take into account 
the market shares of the segments of the product where it has found an 
impact.83 In other words the impact should be limited to the grade of a 
product where an effect is found. 
C. Causation 
China appealed the Panel’s findings on causation. A causation 
analysis ties dumping to an injury determination.84 Investigating auth-
orities must base their causation findings on “all relevant evidence,” 
including information developed by assessing the factors in Articles 3.1, 
3.2, and 3.4.85 Investigating authorities must also eliminate nonattrib-
ution factors at this stage.86 In short, governed by Article 3.5, national  
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. 
79. Id. ¶ 5.205 (quoting Appellate Body Report, China—Countervailing and 
Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the 
United States, ¶ 149, WTO Doc. WT/DS414/AB/R (adopted Nov. 16, 2012)). 
80. Id. (quoting Appellate Body Report, China—Countervailing and Anti-
Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the 
United States, ¶ 149, WTO Doc. WT/DS414/AB/R (adopted Nov. 16, 2012)). 
81. Id. ¶ 5.209. 
82. Id. ¶ 5.210. 
83. Id. ¶ 5.211. 
84. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.5 (“It must be demonstrated 
that the dumped imports are . . . causing injury . . . .”). 
85. Id. (“The demonstration of a causal relationship . . . shall be based on an 
examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities.”). 
86. Id. (“The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the 
dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 3·2016 
China—HP-SSST and Price Undercutting 
900 
investigators must devise a framework for reaching a conclusion on 
causation. 
The Appellate Body rejected all of China’s arguments.87 MOFCOM 
began by contesting the Panel’s findings. It argued that the Panel failed 
to conduct an “objective assessment” of the case.88 MOFCOM’s first 
argument contended that China acknowledged that imported HP-
SSSTs constituted a large market share, even after declining from a 
nearly ninety percent to a fifty percent market share, and that the 
Panel should not have ignored that consideration.89 Because China ack-
nowledged the decrease, but maintained that the market of imported 
goods was still high, such a finding was consistent with its obligations 
to account for a downward trend.90 The Appellate Body disagreed, 
affirming the Panel. The Appellate Body held that MOFCOM was re-
quired to ascertain a reason for the declining market share so that it 
could reasonably consider whether price effects were attenuated on the 
entire industry.91 This was necessary before concluding that there was 
causation between price effects and domestic tubes.92 
Next, China argued that it correctly assumed there was a price 
correlation between imported Grade B and C tubes and domestic Grade 
A tubes. Relying on the assumption that cross-grade price effects are 
implicit, China claimed that imported Grade B and C tubes had a neg-
ative cross-grade price effect on the price of Grade A tubes, even though 
the Grade A tube market was almost completely composed of Chinese 
manufacturers.93 Because cross-grade price effects always exist between 
different grades of a product, China, allegedly, did not have to support 
its conclusion with evidence.94 The Appellate Body rejected the second 
argument too, finding that countries must find cross-grade price correl-
ations, based on objective evidence.95 Once a country confirms that such 
a correlation exists, it must tease out the impact of the correlation. 
 
and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the 
dumped imports.”). 
87. HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 6. 
88. Id. ¶¶ 5.214, 5.244. 
89. Id. ¶ 5.247. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. ¶ 5.248. 
92. Id. ¶¶ 5.248–50. 
93. Id. ¶¶ 5.216, 5.252. 
94. Id. ¶ 5.256. 
95. Id. 
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Thirdly, China contended that high-grade tubes are substitutes for 
low-grade tubes.96 For example, Grade B and C tubes may be used in 
place of Grade A tubes. The Appellate Body disagreed again.97 It emph-
asized that Grade B and C tubes are more expensive than Grade A.98 
Moreover, only Grade B and C tubes are suitable to be used in “ultra-
supercritical boilers.”99 Grade A tubes are inferior in quality and are 
only suitable in boilers that generate power under lower pressure.100 In 
order to prove this claim, a respondent must investigate the extent of 
substitution between grades.101 
Regardless of the Appellate Body’s ruling on each issue, China’s 
appeal on causation fails because it relied on insufficient findings of 
price undercutting and impact on the domestic market. As part of the 
logical progression of Article 3, of the Antidumping Agreement, the 
causation findings were premised on faulty conclusions and ultimately 
unsubstantiated. 
Conclusion 
The Appellate Body’s affirmation in this case presents an interest-
ing trend apparent in antidumping cases against China. According to 
work by Professor Juscelino Colares, there is a perceivable trend of bias 
against respondents in DSB proceedings.102 According to the positive 
theory of litigation, court decisions should equally favor complainants 
 
96. Id. ¶ 5.252. 
97. Id. ¶ 5.263. 
98. Id. ¶ 5.181 (“Grade B is approximately double the price of Grade A, and 
Grade C is approximately triple the price of Grade A.”). 
99. Id. ¶ 5.263.  
100. Id. (“[H]igher-grade products B and C are capable of enduring the greater 
pressures and temperatures produced in ultra-supercritical boilers, and that 
the lower-grade product A is used in lower pressure and temperate environ-
ments in supercritical boilers.”). 
101. Id. (“Given the considerable price and physical differences between the 
different product grades at issue, MOFCOM should, at the very least, have 
assessed the existence and the extent of substitutability of lower- and higher-
end HP-SSST in order to show that ‘alleged substitutability demonstrates 
price correlation’ between each product type.”). 
102. Juscelino F. Colares, A Theory of WTO Adjudication: From Empirical 
Analysis to Biased Rule Development, 42 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 383, 439 
(2009) (“The existence of a sustained pattern of Complainant success, with 
win rates ranging from 83% to 91% across Case Types, constitutes a substan-
tial deviation from the 50% success rate predicted under random litigation 
assumptions.”). 
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and respondents.103 WTO members have brought antidumping cases 
against China on seven occasions and five have survived consult-
ations.104 China has lost all five of these cases, as a respondent.105 While 
five cases is not a statistically significant number to prove bias, it ad-
heres to the general theory. 
In the 1980s, years before China joined the WTO on December 11, 
2001, the US, the EU, Canada, and Australia brought the most anti-
dumping cases.106 Now, the top five implementers of antidumping meas-
ures include India, Argentina, Turkey, and China.107 MOFCOM, be-
tween January 1995 and December 2014, conducted 218 antidumping 
investigations and imposed 176 antidumping duties.108 Approximately 
80.7% of cases led to antidumping duties. That percentage is high. Of 
India, Argentina and Turkey, only Turkey is higher (approx. 90.6%).109 
Although the Appellate Body report and the Panel report had the 
same outcome, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s holdings on 
price undercutting and MOFCOM’s impact analysis. At least one ex-
pert suggests that China—HP-SSST raises the bar for investigating 
 
103. Id. at 385 (“[T[he prevailing positive theory of judicial adjudication explains 
that it is unlikely for a particular type of litigant to systematically prevail over 
time because stronger cases will settle rather than result in full adjudication.”). 
104. Umair H. Ghori, The Dumping Dragon: Analysing China’s Evolving Anti-
Dumping Behaviour, 4 Bus. & Mgmt. Rev. 114, 119 tbl.4 (2013). The seven 
cases treat the Japanese and EU HP-SSST case as one. The number also 
updates Table 4 with one additional case since Ghori’s paper was published. 
Request for Consultations by Canada, China—Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Imports of Cellulose Pulp from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS483/1 (adopted 
Oct. 20, 2014). 
105. Ghori, supra note 104, at 119; HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 
1, ¶ 6.2. 
106. Jackson et al., supra note 3, at 836–37 (“[I]n the 1980s . . . four countries—
the US, the EU, Canada and Australia were by far the major users of AD 
measures. . . . [S]ince 1995, the major users of AD laws are (in order): India, 
the US, the US, the EU, Argentina, China and Turkey.”). 
107. Id.  
108. WTO, Anti-Dumping Initiatives: By Reporting Member 01/01/1995–
31/12/2014, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_Initiation
sByRepMem.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8QT-UN7A] (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) 
[hereinafter WTO, By Reporting Member]; WTO, Anti-Dumping 
Measures: By Reporting Member 01/01/1995–31/12/2014, https:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_MeasuresByRepMem.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XSV6-38G8] (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) [hereinafter WTO, 
Anti-Dumping Measures].  
109. WTO, Anti-Dumping Measures, supra note 108; WTO, By Reporting 
Member, supra note 108. India and Argentina both impose duties in approxi-
mately 72.2% of cases. It is also much higher than the US (65.46%), the EU 
(63.68%), and Canada (60.7%). 
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authorities implementing antidumping duties.110 The price undercutting 
procedures appear particularly suspect. Rajib Pal, of Sidley Austin 
Washington, D.C., proposes three hypothetical scenarios when there 
appears to be dumping, but the holding of China—HP-SSST may im-
pede an injury finding: first, when import and domestic prices fluctuate 
each quarter; second when import prices are above domestic prices, then 
domestic prices increase and remain higher for an equivalent period of 
time; third, when import prices are above domestic prices, then import 
prices decrease so that they fall below domestic prices.111 Pal explains 
that the ITC counts the yearly quarters for each good, then finds 
dumping if import prices exceed domestic prices for a greater number 
of quarters. He argues that China—HP-SSST places a greater burden 
on investigating authorities in the first two scenarios because dumping 
is most apparent when import prices dip below domestic prices.112 
The second scenarios create a troubling outcome. An importing 
manufacturer can theoretically continue to dump goods without being 
identified by a price undercutting analysis. If a company wishes to 
dump, it could wait until prices in the foreign market increase, then by 
merely keeping its prices constant it could essentially dump its goods 
without being suspected. Given this observation the Appellate Body’s 
holding is restrictive and in at least one way ineffectual. 
There are also benefits of the new price undercutting requirements. 
The goal of Article 3.2 is to identify when the price of dumped foreign 
goods affects the price of domestic goods. While the three hypotheticals 
are helpful in considering American trade policy, they also demonstrate 
that the United States also failed to recognize the Appellate Body’s 
understanding of price undercutting. Instead of merely comparing prices 
in different quarters and counting the number of times one price is 
higher than the other, it is important to identify trends. If an 
investigating authority can identify patterns, then it can understand 
whether there is any actual effect on the industry. For future antidump-
ing investigations price-undercutting assessments must evolve so that 
they can more concretely contribute to a finding of injury on a domestic 
industry. 
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